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A strategi foundation for proper equilibriumJohn Kleppe1,2 Peter Borm1 Ruud Hendrikx3Otober 12, 2012AbstratProper equilibrium plays a prominent role in the literature on non-ooperativegames. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as itgives no justiation for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are madewith a signiantly smaller probability than innouous ones. In this paper weprovide a justiation for this idea based on strategi hoies of the players.In this way we provide a strategi foundation for proper equilibrium.Keywords: proper equilibrium, fall bak proper equilibriumJEL Classiation Number: C72
1 Introdution: proper equilibrium and its thoughtexperimentIn this paper we reonsider the onept of proper equilibrium (Myerson (1978))in mixed extensions of a nite strategi games, from now on just abbreviated togames. In order to adequately state our purposes and ideas, we rst reall theunderlying framework and basi notation and denitions. A game is given by G =
(N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N), with N = {1, . . . , n} the player set, ∆M i the mixed strategyspae of player i ∈ N , with M i = {1, . . . , mi} the set of pure strategies, and πi :1CentER and Department of Eonometris and Operations Researh, Tilburg University.2Corresponding author: PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail:J.Kleppeuvt.nl.3CentER and Department of Organization and Strategy, Tilburg University.1
∏
j∈N ∆Mj → R the von Neumann Morgenstern expeted payo funtion of player i.A pure strategy k ∈ M i of player i is alternatively denoted by eik, a typial elementof ∆M i by xi. We denote the probability whih xi assigns to pure strategy k by xik.The set of all strategy proles is given by ∆ = ∏i∈N ∆M i , a typial element of ∆by x.The most fundamental onept in games is that of Nash equilibrium (Nash(1951)). A strategy prole x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of G, denoted by x̂ ∈ NE(G), if
πi(x̂) ≥ πi(xi, x̂−i) for all xi ∈ ∆M i and all i ∈ N . Here (xi, x̂−i) is the frequentlyused shorthand notation for the strategy prole (x̂1, . . . , x̂i−1, xi, x̂i+1, . . . , x̂n).The arrier of a strategy xi is given by C(xi) = {k ∈ M i | xik > 0}, the purebest reply orrespondene of player i by PBi(x−i) = {k ∈ M i | πi(eik, x−i) ≥
πi(eiℓ, x
−i) for all ℓ ∈ M i}. Clearly, x̂ ∈ NE(G) if and only if C(x̂i) ⊆ PBi(x̂−i) forall i ∈ N .The set of Nash equilibria may be very large and an ontain ounterintuitive out-omes. Selten (1965) introdued the onept of perfet equilibrium as a renement ofthe set of Nash equilibria. The essential idea in the thought experiment underlyingperfet equilibrium is that no pure strategy should ever be given zero probability,sine there is always a small hane that any pure strategy might be hosen, if onlyby mistake. To further rene the set of (perfet) equilibria Myerson (1978) intro-dued the onept of proper equilibrium.Denition [Myerson (1978)℄ Let G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be an n-playergame. A strategy prole x ∈ ∆ is a proper equilibrium of G if there exists a se-quene {εt}t∈N of positive real numbers onverging to zero, and a sequene {xt}t∈Nof ompletely mixed strategy proles onverging to x suh that xt is εt-proper forall t ∈ N, i.e.,
πi(eiℓ, x
−i
t ) < π
i(eik, x
−i
t ) ⇒ xit,ℓ ≤ εtxit,k2
for all k, ℓ ∈ M i and all i ∈ N .The properness onept plays an important role in the game theoreti literature andis widely studied in various diretions, see, e.g., Van Damme (1984), Garía-Juradoand Sánhez (1990), Blume et al. (1991), Yamamoto (1993). In the equilibriumrenement literature it is featured most prominently in the work on stable sets(Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Mertens (1989), Hillas (1990) and Mertens (1991)),as eah stable set ontains a proper equilibrium. The attrativeness of the proper-ness onept is mainly based on the fat that this onept selets the intuitivelyappealing strategy ombinations in many (well-known) games (see, e.g., Myerson(1978) and Van Damme (1991)). In that sense we reognize the seletive power ofproper equilibrium. In our opinion, however, the denition and underlying thoughtexperiment of proper equilibrium are somewhat unsatisfying.In the thought experiment underlying properness the idea is that, just as in thethought experiment underlying perfetness, players make mistakes. Contrary tothe onept of perfetness, however, these mistakes are not made randomly; thetrembles are somehow sensible, meaning that innouous mistakes are made with asigniantly higher probability than mistakes that have a substantial negative im-pat on the payo of the players. However, in the thought experiment players havea passive role in the sense that they do not onsiously deide on (an ordering ofthe) alternatives to their preferred strategies. More preisely, in the thought exper-iment underlying properness the alternatives are exogenously ordered based uponthe orresponding payos (given the opponent's strategies). Hene, what is missingis an appropriate justiation for obtaining this spei ordering. This problem isalso addressed in Van Damme (1991) who shows that the use of ontrol osts doesnot provide suh a justiation. We provide a justiation for the fundamental ideaunderlying properness by starting out from a dierent thought experiment.3
In this alternative approah eah player in the thought experiment is onsiousof the fat that both his intended strategy and the intended strategies of his op-ponents might not be exeuted. In this approah we then expliitly model howeah player atively antiipates on the ourrene of suh events. More speially,in this thought experiment all the ations of eah player are bloked with a smallbut positive probability. Sine eah player wants to play a best reply, eah playerhas to strategially deide beforehand on a bak-up ation in ase his rst hoie isbloked. However, sine this bak-up ation might be bloked as well, he also has todeide on a seond bak-up ation in ase the rst bak-up ation turns out to beunavailable, and so forth and so on. Hene, eah player must deide on a ompleteordering of his ations beforehand. The probability with whih a player is unableto play a ertain ation is assumed to be independent of the partiular hoie hemakes. This probability may, however, vary between players.The desribed thought experiment results in the onept of fall bak proper equi-librium, whih alternatively an be seen as a hierarhial extension to the oneptof fall bak equilibrium, introdued by Kleppe et al. (2012a) and further disussedin Kleppe et al. (2012b).To formalize the onept of fall bak proper equilibrium we introdue some ad-ditional notation. The ation set in the fall bak proper game for player i ∈ Nwithin the thought experiment desribed above equals the set of all orderings of theation set M i, and is denoted by Ωi. Hene, the total number of ations in the fallbak proper game for player i equals m̃i = mi!. A typial element of Ωi is denotedby σ, where the ation on position s of σ is given by σ(s) ∈ M i. A pure strategy
σ ∈ Ωi will alternatively be denoted by eiσ. By Ωik ⊆ Ωi, k ∈ M i, we denote the setof orderings of M i for whih σ(1) = k, hene Ωik = {σ ∈ Ωi | σ(1) = k}. The mixedstrategy spae of player i is given by ∆Ωi.We assume that eah ation of player i is bloked with the same probability,4
denoted by εi, but we allow for dierent probabilities among the players. Hene, let














)j∈N)for all i ∈ N . The residual probability in whih at least one player is unable to playany of his ations is impliitly inorporated in this payo funtion, as in that asethe payo to every player is zero. Note that the zero payo is arbitrary and willnot inuene the equilibria of the game, beause it does not depend on the players'strategy hoies.A typial element of ∆Ωi is denoted by ρi, the probability whih ρi assigns to purestrategy σ is given by ρiσ. The set of all strategy proles is given by ∆̃ = ∏i∈N ∆Ωi ,an element of ∆̃ by ρ.Denition Let G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be an n-player game. A strategy pro-le x ∈ ∆ is a fall bak proper equilibrium of G if there exists a sequene {εt}t∈N of
n-tuples of positive real numbers onverging to zero, and a sequene {ρt}t∈N suhthat ρt ∈ NE(G̃(εt)) for all t ∈ N, onverging to ρ ∈ ∆̃, with xik = ∑σ∈Ωi
k
ρiσ for all
k ∈ M i and all i ∈ N . The set of fall bak proper equilibria of a game G is denotedby FBPR(G).In the thought experiment underlying fall bak proper equilibrium all the ations5
of eah player are bloked with a small but positive probability. Therefore, playersdeide beforehand on a omplete ordering of their ations. This is modeled by let-ting players play the fall bak proper game in whih eah ation onsists of a fullordering of the ations of the original game suh that the rst ation is played witha probability lose to one and eah following ation with a smaller probability of axed fator. A fall bak proper equilibrium of the original game is then deduedfrom the limit point of a sequene of Nash equilibria of the orresponding fall bakproper games when the bloking probabilities onverge to zero.Sine fall bak proper equilibrium an be seen as a hierarhial extension of fallbak equilibrium (Kleppe et al. (2012a)), one might think that the set of fall bakproper equilibria renes the set of fall bak equilibria. We refer to Kleppe (2010)for an example whih shows that this is not the ase.The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Setion 2 we providean alternative haraterization of fall bak proper equilibrium based only on lim-itations of the strategy spaes. Using that haraterization we show in Setion 3that the set of fall bak proper equilibria is a (possibly strit) non-empty and losedsubset of the set of proper equilibria, and in Setion 4 that for two-player games thesets of proper and fall bak proper equilibria oinide.2 A haraterization of fall bak proper equilibriumIn this setion we provide an alternative haraterization of fall bak proper equili-brium in whih the perturbations of the thought experiment are fully aptured bylimitations of the strategy spaes. This allows for a perturbed game of the samedimensions as the original one. For a (suiently small) bloking vetor δ ∈ RN+ , thebloking game G(δ) = (N, {∆M i(δi)}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) is dened to be the game whihonly diers from G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) in the sense that the strategy spaes6
are restrited to
∆M i(δ





1− (δi)mi for all T i ⊆ M i}for all i ∈ N , with the domains of the payo funtions restrited aordingly. Wedene the set of all strategy proles of the bloking game by ∆(δ) = Πj∈N∆Mj (δj).Note that this bloking game gives the maximum probability by whih eah num-ber of ations an be played, e.g., if player i puts the maximum allowed probabilityon the ations in a set T i, then any other strategy k /∈ T i an be played with aprobability of at most (1− δi)(δi)|T i|.Lemma 2.1 Let G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be an n-player game. Let δ ∈
R
N
+ be a bloking vetor, and let G̃(δ) = (N, {∆Ωi}i∈N , {πiδ}i∈N) and G(δ) =
(N, {∆M i(δi)}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be the orresponding fall bak proper and bloking game,respetively. Then there exists an onto map fδ : ∆̃ → ∆(δ) suh that πiδ(ρ) =





1− (δi)mifor all k ∈ M i and all i ∈ N . By onsidering the most extreme ase in whih ρiσ isa pure strategy in the fall bak proper game, it is readily heked that ∑k∈T i xik ≤
1− (δi)|T i|
1− (δi)mi for all T i ⊆ M i suh that x ∈ ∆(δ). Furthermore, the probabilitiesput by strategy prole x on all the ation proles in the game G are equal tothe probabilities put by ρ on these ation proles multiplied by 1
Πj∈N(1− (δj)mj )
.Hene, πiδ(ρ) = πi(x) ·Πj∈N(1− (δj)mj ) = πi(fδ(ρ)) ·Πj∈N(1− (δj)mj ) for all i ∈ N .Finally, it is readily heked that fδ is onto. As a onsequene of Lemma 2.1, a fall bak proper equilibrium an also be denedin terms of a sequene of Nash equilibria of bloking games.7
Theorem 2.2 Let G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be an n-player game. Then, astrategy prole x ∈ ∆ is a fall bak proper equilibrium of G if and only if thereexists a sequene {δt}t∈N of bloking vetors of positive real numbers onverging tozero and a sequene {xt}t∈N onverging to x suh that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all t ∈ N.Proof: We just prove the only if part, the reverse statement an be shown analo-gously. Assume x̂ ∈ FBPR(G). Then by denition there exists a sequene {δt}t∈Nof n-tuples of positive real numbers onverging to zero, and a sequene {ρ̂t}t∈N on-verging to ρ̂ ∈ ∆̃, with x̂ik = ∑σ∈Ωi
k
ρ̂iσ for all k ∈ M i and all i ∈ N , suh that
ρ̂t ∈ NE(G̃(δt)) for all t ∈ N. By Lemma 2.1 there exists a sequene {x̂t}t∈N onver-ging to x̂ ∈ ∆, with x̂t ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N, suh that πi(x̂t) = πiδt(ρ̂t)
Πj∈N(1− (δj)mj )for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N.Let i ∈ N . We show that πi(x̂t) ≥ πi(xit, x̂−it ) for all xit ∈ ∆M i(δit) and all t ∈ N,whih proves that x̂t ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all t ∈ N and therefore ompletes the proof.Let t ∈ N and let (xit, x̂−it ) ∈ ∆(δt). Then by Lemma 2.1 we an take a strategy
(ρit, ρ̂
−i















= πi(x̂t).Consequently, πi(x̂t) ≥ πi(xit, x̂−it ) for all xit ∈ ∆M i(δit) and all t ∈ N. Note that it immediately follows from Theorem 2.2 that eah ompletely mixed Nashequilibrium is a fall bak proper equilibrium.
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3 General resultsIn this setion we show that the set of fall bak proper equilibria is a (possibly strit)non-empty and losed subset of the set of proper equilibria.Theorem 3.1 Let G be an n-player game. Then eah fall bak proper equilibriumof G is a proper equilibrium of G.Proof: Let G = (N, {∆M i}i∈N , {πi}i∈N) be an n-player game and let x ∈




) < πi(eik, x
−i
t̂








≤ εt̂xit̂,k.Consequently, {εt}t∈N is a sequene of positive real numbers onverging to zeroand {xt}t∈N is a sequene of ompletely mixed strategy proles onverging to x suhthat for all t ∈ N
πi(eiℓ, x
−i
t ) < π
i(eik, x
−i
t ) ⇒ xit,ℓ ≤ εtxit,kfor all k, ℓ ∈ M i and all i ∈ N . Hene, x is a proper equilibrium. Hene, the set of fall bak proper equilibria is a subset of the set of proper equilibria.The following theorem states that this subset is non-empty and losed.Theorem 3.2 Let G be an n-player game. Then the set of fall bak proper equi-libria of G is non-empty and losed. 9
Proof: We rst show non-emptiness. Let {δt}t∈N be a sequene of bloking ve-tors onverging to zero. Take a sequene {xt}t∈N suh that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all
t ∈ N. Sine the strategy spaes are ompat, there exists a subsequene of {xt}t∈Nonverging to, say, x ∈ ∆. By Theorem 2.2, x ∈ FBPR(G).Seondly, we show that FBPR(G) is losed. Take a onverging sequene {xt}t∈Nwith xt ∈ FBPR(G) for all t ∈ N, with limit x. For all t ∈ N there exists a sequene
{δtr}r∈N of bloking vetors onverging to zero and a sequene {xtr}r∈N onvergingto xt suh that












e11 10, 10, 10 0, 10, 0 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 10 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
e12 10, 1, 0 2, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
e13 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 5 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0In this example it is possible to oordinate the probabilities on the lower-level ationsin suh a way that x = (e11, e21, e31) is a proper equilibrium. This type of oordina-tion is, however, not possible in the thought experiment underlying fall bak properequilibrium, as players are not free to make these lower-level mistakes that justhappen to make things work, as their assumed ative role requires them to play a(hierarhial) best reply. 10
Consider the sequene {εt}t∈N, with εt = 1t for all t ∈ N, onverging to zeroand the sequene {x̄t}t∈N onverging to x ∈ ∆, with x̄t for all t ∈ N given by
x̄1t = (1− 125t − 11000t2 )e11 + 125te12 + 11000t2 e13, x̄2t = (1− 1100t − 1100t2 )e21 + 1100te22 + 1100t2 e23and x̄3t = (1 − 3100t )e31 + 3100te32. Then x̄t is εt-proper for all t ∈ N and hene, x is aproper equilibrium.If x would be a fall bak proper equilibrium, there should exist a sequene {δt}t∈Nof bloking vetors onverging to zero and a sequene {x̂t}t∈N onverging to x suhthat x̂t ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N, with a t ∈ N suh that π1(e11, x̂−1t ) ≥ π1(e12, x̂−1t ),
π2(e21, x̂
−2
t ) ≥ π2(e22, x̂−2t ) and π3(e31, x̂−3t ) ≥ π3(e32, x̂−3t ). However, note that
π1(e11, x̂
−1
t ) ≥ π1(e12, x̂−1t ) implies that δ3t ≥ 2δ2t , π2(e21, x̂−2t ) ≥ π2(e22, x̂−2t ) impliesthat δ1t ≥ δ3t and π3(e31, x̂−3t ) ≥ π3(e32, x̂−3t ) implies that δ2t ≥ √5δ1t . Combining allthis results in δ1t ≥ 2√5δ1t , whih is not possible for δ1t > 0. Consequently, x is nota fall bak proper equilibrium. ⊳4 Results for two-player gamesIn the previous setion we showed that in general the set of fall bak proper equilibriais a (possibly strit) subset of the set of proper equilibria. Interestingly, for two-player games the sets of proper and fall bak proper equilibria oinide.Theorem 4.1 Let G be a two-player game. Then the sets of proper and fall bakproper equilibria of G oinide.Proof: Let G = ({1, 2}, {∆M i}i∈{1,2}, {πi}i∈{1,2}) be a two-player game. Sine
FBPR(G) ⊆ PR(G) for all n-player games (Theorem 3.1), we only have to showthat PR(G) ⊆ FBPR(G). Let x ∈ PR(G). Then there exists a sequene {εt}t∈Nof positive real numbers onverging to zero, and a sequene {xt}t∈N of ompletelymixed strategy proles onverging to x suh that xt is εt-proper for all t ∈ N, i.e.,
πi(eiℓ, x
−i
t ) < π
i(eik, x
−i
t ) ⇒ xit,ℓ ≤ εtxit,k11
for all k, ℓ ∈ M i and all i ∈ N .Let i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N. We divide the ations of player i reursively in a nite num-ber Sit of best reply sets suh that Qit(s) = {k ∈ M i\ ∪r∈{1,...,s−1} Qit(r) | πi(eik, xjt) ≥
πi(eiℓ, x
j
t ) for all ℓ ∈ M i\ ∪r∈{1,...,s−1} Qit(r)} for all s ∈ {1, . . . , Sit}. Note that sine









if k ∈ Qit(s),









1− (δit)mifor all i ∈ {1, 2}, with b = | ∪r<s Qit(r)|.It follows that the sequene {x̂t}t∈N onverges to x and that x̂t ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N.It remains to be shown that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all t ∈ N, πi(x̂t) ≥ πi(ẋit, x̂−it ) forall ẋit ∈ ∆M i(δit). Sine eah player has only one opponent, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all
ℓ ∈ M i, {k ∈ M i | πi(eik, x−it ) ≥ πi(eiℓ, x−it )} = {k ∈ M i |πi(eik, x̂−it ) ≥ πi(eiℓ, x̂−it )}.Hene, let i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ N, and let k ∈ Qit(s) and ℓ ∈ Qit(s′), with s < s′. Thenthere is number U ∈ {1, . . . , S−it } suh that
πi(eik, x̄
−i




for all 1 ≤ u < U , and
πi(eik, x̄
−i
t (U)) > π
i(eiℓ, x̄
−i
t (U)).This implies that in x̂t player i reursively puts the maximum allowed probabilityon eah following best reply level. Consequently, πi(x̂t) ≥ πi(ẋit, x̂−it ) for all ẋit ∈
∆M i(δ
i
t). Therefore, x ∈ FBPR(G). Referen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